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What are ‘Universalizable Interests’?
1 
 
 
Many of Habermas’s critical commentators agree that Discourse Ethics fails 
as a theory of the validity of moral norms and only succeeds as a theory of the 
democratic legitimacy of socio-political norms.
2
 The reason they give is that the 
moral principle (U) is too restrictive to count as a necessary condition of the 
validity of norms. Other more sympathetic commentators want to abandon 
principle (U) and remodel Discourse Ethics without it.
3
 Still others, try to 
downplay the role of universalizing moral discourse and to make more of 
Habermas’s less demanding, though still somewhat vague, conception of ethical 
discourse.
4
 Against this chorus of critical voices Habermas maintains that his 
conception of moral discourse and the moral  principle (U) are central to 
Discourse Ethics in general, and to the normative heart of his political theory in 
particular.  
This conflict may have arisen in part because of the obscurity surrounding the 
central concept of a ‘universalizable interest’. Actually Habermas’s concept of 
interest is pretty obscure too. But the obscurity surrounding the concept of 
interest is not the issue here. For our present purposes we can simply stipulate 
that an interest is a reason to want.
5
 The obscurity that is the problem here arises 
from ambiguities in the notion of universalizability that is in play. Once we pay 
due attention to the conditions of the universalizability of interests contained in 
Habermas’s formulation of the moral principle (U), we can distinguish between 
a weaker and a stronger version of it. I argue that only the weaker version is 
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defensible. But I also want to show why Habermas is tempted into defending the 
stronger version. 
2. The Meaning  and Function of Principle (U) 
 
A recent formulation of (U) states that:  
a norm is valid if and only if the foreseeable consequences and side effects 
of its general observance for the interests and value-orientations of each 
individual could be freely accepted jointly by all concerned. (OCCM p. 
354/DEA p. 60)
6
 
The most recent formulations of (U), unlike the earlier ones, make clear 
that the amenability to a consensus of interests is a sufficient as well as a 
necessary condition of a norm’s validity.
7
 The trouble is that, thus formulated, 
(U) is fraught with ambiguity. (U) could be taken to mean that in discourse 
validity is conferred on a norm if and only if everyone can ‘freely and jointly’ 
accept it on the basis of an interest in its general observance, though not 
necessarily the same one. Call this unofficial version of (U), (U)1.  Alternatively, 
however, (U) could mean that validity is conferred on a norm if and only if there 
is ‘free joint acceptance’ of it on the basis of one and the same interest in its 
general observance. 
This ambiguity is contained in all the various formulations of principle 
(U) (MCCA 65 & 197: OCCM 354: BFN 108: DEA 60). It also infects many 
of Habermas’s descriptions of valid moral norms as ‘equally good for all’ or 
‘equally in everyone’s interest’, as embodying ‘universally shared’, ‘common’, 
‘general’ or ‘universalizable’ interests, and in his claim that moral norms can be 
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‘willed from the perspective of everyone’. It is a systematic ambiguity, not a 
slip. 
It is easy to see why Habermas must reject the unofficial version. We must 
bear in mind that Habermas thinks that interests provide participants in 
discourse with reasons to assent to norms. Now, consider the case of a culturally 
mixed and economically self-sufficient community in which everyone agrees 
that one should not eat pork, but for different reasons. Some members of a this 
community do not eat pork because they believe God has proscribed it, the 
others because they are vegetarians. For argument’s sake let us assume that the 
believers are not vegetarian and the vegetarians are not believers. So everyone in 
this community can assent to the ‘norm’ that one should not eat pork, since its 
general observance satisfies their different, albeit compatible, interests. 
According to the unofficial version of (U) this norm would be valid. On the 
official version it would not. Since the two parties have different interests, hence 
different reasons, to assent to the norm that prohibits eating pork, their 
consensus is wholly serendipitous; it is not ‘rationally motivated’. 
The example is contrived, but it shows why Habermas is wedded to the 
official version. Discourse conforming to (U) is supposed to aim at establishing 
‘rationally motivated’ consensus, not compromise or de facto agreement. 
Compromise and merely de facto agreement may rest on a mere overlap of 
different interests and thus on different reasons. And a discursive consensus is 
rationally motivated only if everyone can accept the same norm ‘for the same 
reasons’ [aus denselben Gründen] which means on the basis of the same 
interest. (SE 78-82; DEA 108).
8
 It lies at the heart of Habermas’s disagreement 
 4 
with the later Rawls that the ideal prosecution of a moral discourse ensures that 
this condition is met.
9
 
Whereas parties brokering a compromise can assent to the result each for 
different reasons, participants in argumentation aim to secure a rationally 
motivated consensus, if at all, then on the basis of the same reasons. (DEA 
108) 
This requirement effectively rules out the unofficial version, (U)1. 
Unfortunately though, it only partly clears up the ambiguity in (U). 
3. Distributive and Collective Universalizability 
 
Officially then, (U) requires that everyone be able to accept a norm for the 
same reason, on the basis of the same interest. But this just raises another 
problem. What is to count as everyone’s having the ‘same’ interest in a norm 
and as accepting it ‘in the same way’ or assenting to it ‘for the same reason’? 
This second problem turns on the question of how interests are individuated.  
 Take the norm N1: ‘do not inflict unnecessary pain on others’. This is 
the kind of norm that the procedure of discourse conforming to (U) should 
validate. If not, something must be awry with the procedure. For the intuition 
that everyone has an interest in avoiding pain is very deeply rooted.
10
 But can 
everyone be said to have the same interest in N1, and, if so, in what sense? Here 
we need to bring in the distinction between two kinds of universalizability - 
distributive and collective.
11
  
An interest is distributively universalizable if and only if each person can 
agree that they have their own such interest. It helps to represent this with a 
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more formal notation. In compliance with (U) the scope of quantification is 
restricted to the domain of all persons potentially concerned by the general 
implementation of the norm, N1. Let ‘xI’ abbreviate the relation ‘x has an 
interest in’, and ‘F’ stand for ‘avoids’. The interest, I, is distributively 
universalizable if and only if: 
∀x (xI [F (x, x*’s pain)])  Call this I1. 
It is a formal feature of all distributively universalizable interests that in 
each case the object or aim of the interest - that F (x, x*’s pain) - refers 
pronominally back to its subject, to whomever it belongs, x. This makes all 
distributively universalizable interests agent-relative.
12
 Further, each universally 
distributed interest has a numerically distinct content in virtue of the numerical 
difference between the interest holders.  
   [F (a, a*’s pain)]  
xI1  [F (b, b*’s pain)]     
   [F (c, c*’s pain)] 
Practically speaking, the differences are important. Each person’s agent-
relative interest/reason provides that person with a different aim.
13
 Morally 
speaking, though, each different interest counts equally. That is why the natural 
temptation here to say that everyone has the ‘same’ interest is correct. Under the 
description, I1, they do. 
Of course there is cultural and historical variation in how experience of 
the need to avoid pain is interpreted. The Spartan warrior interpreted his need to 
avoid pain very differently from a late-twentieth Century academic.
14
 And 
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Allison who chose to have a natural childbirth had a very different interest in 
avoiding her labor pains, than I do in avoiding my toothache. The threshold of 
pain to be borne or avoided depends upon whose pain and what kind of pain it 
is. Nonetheless it is uncontroversial that for all human beings in all situations, 
even those in which pain is voluntarily endured, there are degrees of pain and 
kinds of pain it is reasonable to want to avoid. The description, I1, captures 
formally only this very general structure, common to all interpretations of the 
need to avoid pain. 
By contrast an interest is collectively universalizable if and only if 
‘everyone’ can agree that they hold a single interest in common. But what kind 
of interests can be held in common by everyone? I take it that everyone’s 
interest in there not being a global environmental catastrophe or in the planet’s 
not careering out of its orbit are examples of collectively universalizable 
interests. But such global interests as these are pretty remote from our moral 
lives, and not at all the kind of thing we would be likely to appeal to in 
discourse, even implicitly, in order to resolve moral conflicts.  
Fortunately not all collectively universalizable interests are so remote. 
There are collectively universalizable interests in basic, irreducibly social goods, 
i.e. goods which everyone wants and which can only be pursued and enjoyed in 
concert with others. My interest in freedom of expression, to use an example 
due to Joseph Raz, is not just an interest in my freedom to express myself but 
one which extends to other people’s freedom of expression too.
 15
 The 
satisfaction of my interest depends on the existence of a common liberal culture 
which arises through the free exchange of information which occurs only where 
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other people’s interest in the freedom of expression is protected. To take a 
different example, my interest in my having a clean environment is also an 
interest in everyone’s having a clean environment, insofar as the ecological 
balance is ultimately a global not a local phenomenon. 
Collectively universalizable interests are characterized by universality on 
two levels; their universal content or aim as well as their ubiquitous distribution. 
Everyone has an interest in everyone’s freedom of expression or clean 
environment. Moreover, they exist on a higher plane of abstraction than 
distributively universalizable interests. We can represent this formally by adding 
another variable and deleting the reference to the agent from the content of the 
interest, within the inner brackets. To revert to our first example, there is a 
collectively universalizable interest in pain avoidance, if and only if: 
∀x ∀y (xI [F (y, y*’s pain)])  Call this I2. 
According to I2 there is a collective interest in avoiding pain if and only if 
everybody has an interest in everybody’s avoiding their own pain.  
 There are two things to note about I2. Firstly, the aim of the interest 
contains no pronominal back reference to the interest holder, hence the structure 
of the interest is agent-neutral and not agent-relative. Secondly, with I2, every 
person’s interest in N1 has exactly the same content, namely that F (y, y*’s pain) 
and each has exactly the same collective aim.  
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aI 
bI   [F (y, y*’s pain)] 
cI 
The avoidance of pain is not a good candidate for a collectively 
universalizable interest. Yet the free expression example and the clean 
environment example which are prima facie more promising invite the 
following objection. It might be thought that the good provided by a liberal 
culture of free expression is only collective in the following sense: the 
satisfaction of one person’s interest in free expression is conditional upon the 
more widespread satisfaction of that interest. The practice of free expression or 
environmental responsibility must be widespread enough that a common good 
emerges which is available to individuals qua individuals. Nevertheless it is not 
true that my having interest in my enjoying freedom of expression (or an 
unpolluted environment) entails that I have interest in everyone else’s interest in 
these things. My interest in other people’s interests may only be instrumental 
and selfish and, therefore, these other people need not be everyone, only 
numerous enough to produce the requisite social good.  
To avoid this objection we must only note that the suppression of some 
people’s or even one person’s interest in free expression is deleterious to the 
common good of a liberal culture. Similarly, if we assume that the environment 
is ultimately a global not a local ecological system, we can say that everyone’s 
environment is damaged in some way whenever anyone pollutes it. Assuming 
further that everyone aims at a good in the highest degree, or in its most 
complete form, then we are right to say that each person’s interest in free 
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expression or in a clean environment for herself implies an interest in free 
expression or a clean environment for everyone. These interests are therefore 
collectively and not distributively universalizable in the sense outlined above. 
 If this is correct, interest I can justify norm N1 under two different 
descriptions. For both I1 and I2 fulfill the requirement that everybody be able to 
assent to a norm for the same reason, on the basis of the same interest. In turn, 
this opens up two further possible interpretations of the official version of (U): 
(U)2, a norm is valid if and only if it embodies an interest which is either 
distributively universalizable or collectively universalizable; and (U)3, a norm is 
valid if and only if it embodies a collectively universalizable interest. 
 
4. Universalizability and Agent-neutrality in Discourse Ethics 
So far as I can see, Habermas hedges his bets with regard to (U)2 and (U)3. 
In his response to the objection that (U) sets an implausibly restrictive necessary 
condition on the justifiability of norms, Habermas endorses (U)2. But when 
explaining how the principle captures the cognitive content of moral 
normativity, in contrast to the contractualism of Hobbes or Rawls, he adduces 
(U)3. 
 For example, in his response to Steven Lukes Habermas writes: ‘I do not 
understand why he (Lukes) thinks this requirement is too strong.’ He goes on to 
claim that there are many examples of norms embodying universalizable 
interests ‘from traffic rules to basic institutional norms’. (HCD 257) Insofar as 
we can say that traffic regulations rest on a single universalizable interest, then it 
seems to me to be distributively and not collectively universalizable.
16
 For, as a 
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vehicle user, my interest in the traffic’s being able to flow depends on my 
interest in my being able to travel freely. Habermas seems to be allowing that 
distributively universalizable interests are sufficient to justify norms, as (U)2 has 
it.
17
 
By contrast, in his work since 1988, Habermas has tended to endorse (U)3 
and to reject (U)2.  In order to show that my argument here does not rest on any 
lack of interpretative charity, and at the risk of labouring the point, I shall 
adduce four different examples.  
1. Habermas insists that there is a conceptual link between justice and 
universal solidarity. In Justification and Application he writes that ‘universal 
solidarity’ or ‘solidarity with everything with a human face’ is the other side of 
justice understood as the principle of equal respect for all.
18
 The relation of 
solidarity usually means taking an interest in other people’s interests; it is a 
collective rather than a distributive sharing of interests. Universal solidarity 
refers to the relation that obtains when each person takes interest in the interests 
of all others. This may imply an intrinsic and direct interest arising out of 
sympathy, rather than the kind of interweaving of the concern for oneself and 
the concern for others that we saw in the free expression and the clean 
environment examples.  Nevertheless in each case the interest in question is 
directed towards the interests of all others and is, in the sense outlined above, 
collectively universalizable. 
2. Habermas distinguishes the discourse theory of morality as a form of 
‘moral cognitivism’ from certain forms of contractualism and from Rawls’s 
‘political’ conception of justice.
19
 The latter, he argues, fail to capture the 
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‘cognitive content’ of moral norms. Part of Habermas’s argument is his 
semantic claim that norms that are justified by agent-neutral and not merely 
agent-relative reasons, capture the cognitive meaning of moral utterances. 
Roughly what he means is that moral utterances have cognitive meaning 
because they are analogous to assertions in certain basic syntactic, semantic and 
pragmatic respects: they are syntactically disciplined; they make a claim to  
property (truth or rightness) which is absolute and stable, and they connect in 
the appropriate way with consensus in discourse. Thus he claims that, 
Normative reasons are - unlike mere declarations of intent or simple 
imperatives - not agent-relative reasons for one’s own...instrumental 
behavior, but - as in the case of assertions - agent-neutral reasons. (SE 
78)
20
 
It is evident that Habermas must be endorsing (U)3. On standard accounts 
agent-relative reasons include an essential pronominal reference back to the 
agent; agent-neutral reasons do not.
21
 We have already seen that I1 is agent-
relative, because its content, F (x, x’s pain), refers back to the interest holder, 
and that I2, by contrast, is agent-neutral because it does not. In the passage cited, 
Habermas’s claim is that not just the moral norms, but also the reasons that 
justify those norms, must be agent-neutral.
22
 The implication is that agent-
neutral principles that are only justified by relative reasons are not yet moral 
principles. The further step to morality requires that valid norms be amenable to 
agent-neutral justification. For only agent-neutral reasons are ‘epistemic’ in the 
sense that they are relevantly analogous with the truth-seeking reasons justifying 
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assertions. (DEA 15: SED 78) And, as we have seen, only collectively 
universalizable interests furnish agent-neutral reasons. 
3. In the context of a critical discussion of Rawls’s overlapping consensus 
Habermas writes: 
It is counterintuitive for the moral authority of a public conception of 
justice to rest on reasons that are not public. Everything valid must also be 
publicly justifiable. Valid utterances deserve to be universally recognized 
on the basis of the same reasons...Such a practice of justification [i.e. 
moral discourse not compromise G.F.] aims at a publicly and collectively 
achieved consensus. (DEA 108: my emphasis) 
Habermas uses the terms ‘justice’ and ‘morality’ interchangeably. If we replace 
the term ‘public’ with ‘impartial’ or ‘agent-neutral’, which in no way alters the 
sense of the passage, and if we bear in mind that collectively but not 
distributively universalizable interests imply agent-neutral reasons, it becomes 
clear again that he endorses (U)3. 
4. Finally, Habermas often presents moral discourse as a process in which all 
‘agent-relative’ reasons, along with all ethical and evaluative considerations that 
presuppose the particular life-histories, projects and self-understanding of 
individuals, are ‘uprooted’ and left behind. (MCCA 161) Echoing Marx’s 
famous metaphor, he claims that agent-relative reasons are part of the historical 
and cultural ‘shell’ which must be stripped away in discourse to reveal the 
‘rational kernel’ of universalist morality. (ED 40). But that means that the 
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rational kernel of morality contains no distributively universalizable interests, 
and that Habermas is endorsing (U)3, and rejecting (U)2. 
5. Objections to (U)3 
If I am correct, in the course of the last two decades Habermas has 
exploited the ambiguity in the official version of (U) by sliding between two 
different positions. To begin with he explicitly endorses (U)2, but later he rejects 
this and commits himself to (U)3. In my view this is a mistake. For (U)3 makes 
Habermas’s Discourse Ethics vulnerable to the standard objection to (U). The 
standard objection is that (U) imposes an implausibly restrictive necessary 
condition of the validity of moral norms. The most cogent version of this 
objection is the redundancy argument. According to the redundancy argument 
(U) sets such strict conditions of universalizability that it leaves few survivors. 
Even allowing that those few norms that survive (U) capture our deepest 
intuitions about what counts as a valid moral norm, it still follows that moral 
discourse can at most play a peripheral role in our moral lives.
23
 But that is 
tantamount to conceding that moral discourse is not up to the social and 
pragmatic tasks of resolving conflicts of interest and orienting interaction in the 
life-world that discourse ethics assigns to it. This raises two further questions. 
Why do we life-world inhabitants persist in making moral discourse a central 
part of our lives if it produces such meager results for social cooperation? And 
why does Habermas’s political and legal theory privilege moral discourse, rather 
than the mechanisms to which we resort in order to regulate the many conflicts 
of interest, which cannot be resolved by moral discourse? 
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Although the secondary literature focuses almost exclusively on the 
redundancy argument and on Habermas’s various responses to it, (U)3  is open to 
a different set of arguments.
 24
 Firstly, the very strong claim that adequate 
justifications of moral norms must exclude agent-relative reasons is certainly 
false. I1 must enter somewhere into the justification of N1. Each person’s 
interest in avoiding pain to them must play apart in the justification of the norm, 
‘do not cause unnecessary pain to others’. For even to recognize that other 
people’s pain deserve equal consideration to my own, I need to be able to 
understand and to identify with their interest in avoiding their pain, from their 
point of view. Achieving that level of empathy means understanding that their 
pain looms larger in their life than my pain does. I come to that understanding 
partly by observing their behavior and partly by projecting from my own relation 
to my pain. So, unless I keep my interest in avoiding my pain firmly in view, I 
cannot achieve the insight into other people’s pain that moral discourse requires.   
Of course, Habermas can just modify the claim that moral discourse 
excludes all agent-relative interests, to the weaker claim that it transforms or 
eliminates all particular agent-relative interests. But what about the weaker 
claim that only agent-neutral reasons are sufficient to justify moral norms, the 
claim that I2 is necessary to justify N1?  I think it is quite plausible that agent-
relative interests might sometimes be sufficient to justify norms and that I2 is 
not necessary to justify N1. 
Imagine a moral community in which there are no universal collective 
goods and no collectively universalizable interests. In this community agent-
relative reasons furnished by distributively universalizable interests justify 
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norms. In such a community my interest in avoiding pain to me, conjoined with 
my recognition of everyone else’s interest in avoiding pain to them, is, when 
universalized, sufficient to justify N1. On this view everyone has the same 
reason, indeed everyone has equal reason to agree to a norm, but this reason is 
not impartial or neutral in Habermas’s sense. Such a community need not be 
without first-order agent-neutral prescriptions or norms, such as ‘do not steal’, 
‘do not kill’, or, to us our previous example, ‘do not cause unnecessary pain to 
others’. Although each person has no interest in other people avoiding pain to 
them, they still have prudential reasons to recognize that everyone else has an 
interest in avoiding their own pain. Everyone’s distributively universalizable 
interests deserve recognition in this sense. But they also deserve recognition just 
because they are distributively universalizable, and are thus especially good at 
coordinating interaction. Our imagined community could adopt Habermas’s 
favored example of a valid moral norm, namely, the universal human right to 
life.
25
 It could also have second order agent-neutral norms, for example that 
everyone should obey the valid first order norms. Yet none of these norms, even 
if they are themselves agent-neutral, are justified by agent-neutral reasons 
resting on collectively universalizable interests. Rather, they are justified by the 
relevant distributively universalizable interest, plus the general awareness that 
everyone indeed has that interest. Perhaps a more impartial outlook would be 
admirable. But it is not obviously necessary. All that is necessary is that I 
recognize that my interest in avoiding my pain counts no more and no less in 
favor of the adoption of a norm than every other person’s interest.  
 16 
This imagined community is sufficiently like our own to undermine the 
intuitive basis of the claim that only collectively universalizable interests are 
sufficient to justify norms. It is true that morality is more than a matter of 
enlightened self-interest, indeed more than enlightened ‘agent-relative interest’ 
which need not be self-concerned. We can even grant, although it is debatable, 
that all moral norms are agent-neutral. Certainly very many are. We can accept 
all this and still deny Habermas’s claim that moral norms can only be justified 
by agent-neutral reasons, and that agent-relative reasons are not sufficient to 
justify moral norms. Intuition, then, does not support the view that norms must 
be amenable to a consensus on the basis of agent-neutral reasons furnished by 
the collectively universalizable interests of participants in discourse. 
Not only does Habermas not have intuition on his side here, he has good 
reason not to hold that moral norms must be agent-neutral all the way down to 
the reason that justify them. For this is uncomfortably close to a doctrine of 
Kant’s that Habermas rejects, namely that moral actions must be justified by 
pure practical reasons, that moral maxims must be adopted solely on the basis of 
a priori or ‘purely rational’ interests. (MCCA 197: OCCM 345)  Habermas 
studiously avoids all talk of  ‘pure’ or a priori interests which, he claims, is 
saddled with the baggage of Kant’s two worlds metaphysics. Yet he himself 
separates impartial moral reasons rigidly from agent-relative reasons. He 
maintains that it is epistemologically possible to distinguish moral norms strictly 
from all other evaluative considerations on the grounds that the former are 
agent-neutral all the way down.  
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Secondly, by banishing agent-relative reasons from the sphere of moral 
discourse, Habermas loses the advantages offered by interest-based accounts of 
practical reason, like Hegel’s. One advantage of an interest-based account is that 
by exploring the close connection between moral reasons and the lived 
experience of real individuals, it can offer a very plausible account of moral 
motivation. Discourse Ethics as conceived by Habermas, namely as a program 
of the justification of the moral principle or the moral standpoint (MCCA 43, 
78-86, 96: OCCM 347) does not include an account of moral motivation. 
However, it is supposed to be consistent with an empirical moral psychology. 
The more Habermas insists on the radical impartiality of moral justification, the 
harder it will be to hook up Discourse Ethics with a plausible moral psychology.  
Thirdly and finally, by thus committing himself to (U)3 Habermas fails to 
do justice to what is an essential feature of interests. Let me illustrate this point 
with an example of tryingly clever conversation from Ally McBeal. 
Ally, what makes your problems bigger than everyone else’s? 
They’re mine! 
Ally’s problems, like most people’s, are due to the frustration of her 
interests. Notice she does not say that her problems (interests) are bigger (or 
seem bigger to her) than everyone else’s, because they are about her, but 
because they belong to her. These are different and independent claims. For not 
all of her problems are about her; not all of her interests selfish. What makes her 
interests bigger than everyone else’s is just this, that they are hers. It is a 
question of perspective.  
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So far I have not distinguished this perspectival feature of interests from 
their ‘agent-relativity’. But it is not just agents who have interests. Strictly 
speaking the focus of Discourse Ethics is on morally justifying reasons, rather 
than on reasons to act - practical reasons. It may be more appropriate, then, to 
talk about the ‘relationality’ of interests, and leave the terms of the relation 
open. But ‘relationality’ does not quite capture the first-person nature of 
interests. For the want of a better English term, Heidegger’s ‘Jemeinigeit’ most 
aptly captures the feature of interests I am talking about - the fact that interests 
are in each case mine.
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 Whatever an interest is an interest in, it belongs to 
someone. Even a collective or group interest belongs to the group only by virtue 
of belonging to the individuals who comprise the group. To my way of thinking 
any interest-based account of moral reasons worth its salt has to do justice to the 
irreducible Jemeinigkeit of interests. Discourse Ethics, in its present form, does 
not. Moral discourse conforming to (U) is a procedure which begins from the 
perspective of each participant, but in the process ‘the reasons adduced lose the 
actor-relative meaning of practical motives and assume an epistemic meaning 
under the aspect of symmetrical consideration. (OCCM 355: DEA 60) 
 But then it seems that the ‘epistemic’ basis of the moral requirement that I 
give equal weight to the interests of all, friends and strangers alike, cuts moral 
discourse adrift from a fundamental, orientating and perspective-giving feature 
of interests, namely, their being in-each-case-mine.
27
 This sits ill with the 
aspiration of discourse theory to provide an intersubjective or interpersonal 
rather than an objectivist model of the validity of moral norms. 
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If I am right, all these difficulties can be avoided if Habermas adopts (U)2 
and rejects (U)3. So the question arises, ‘why does Habermas adopt the stronger 
and less plausible position?’ The only explanations I can think of are the 
following.  
1. Habermas may mistakenly assume that the distinction between 
universalizable and non-universalizability (particular) interests lies parallel with 
that between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons. In fact, the former 
distinction is orthogonal to the latter: some agent-relative interests/reasons can 
be universalized.
28
 Once Habermas allows the two distinctions to cross, he can 
hold that (participants in moral discourse must assume that) everyone can assent 
to a norm for the same universalizable reason, without insisting that this reason 
be agent-neutral into the bargain. 
2. Alternatively Habermas allows that universalizability does not always reliably 
correlate with agent-neutrality. However, he assumes that discourse meta-ethics 
requires that moral reasons be impartial, i.e. both universalizable and agent-
neutral. In this case the culprit is the supposed analogy between ‘truth and moral 
rightness’, or, as he also puts it, between epistemic and moral reasons. (SE 76-
82: OCCM 344) If it is the analogy that requires (U)3, then Habermas 
presumably has grounds for assuming, as the fixed end of the analogy, that all 
epistemic reasons are impartial. His assumption may be that beliefs and 
assertions are justified by the facts, not by beliefs about facts. For example, the 
reason that justifies my belief that it is dark outside is given by the fact that it is 
dark outside, and can thus be fully articulated without essential reference to me, 
the holder of the belief. This is a fair enough line to take. Even so, it does not 
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warrant the conclusion that all epistemic reasons are impartial, and hence that 
there are no thinker-relative epistemic reasons. My reason for believing that I 
have a headache, or that your joke is funny, or that this letter is addressed to me 
is not agent-neutral. For the facts that justify them contain an ineliminable 
reference to me; the fact that my head aches, the fact that I am amused, and the 
facts that the letter is addressed to GF and I am GF.
29
 These counterexamples 
suggest that not all epistemic reasons are impartial, or, at very least, that this 
cannot be assumed without argument. Hence the analogy between epistemic and 
moral reasons cannot on its own drive the conclusion that all moral reasons 
must be impartial. No doubt there are similarities between epistemic and moral 
reasons, one of which may be that very many epistemic reasons and many moral 
reasons are impartial. But this is not sufficient grounds for rejecting (U)2  and 
accepting (U)3.. 
6. Conclusion 
 
The reasons why Habermas should reject (U)3  and endorse (U)2 instead 
are overwhelming. Phenomenologically speaking it would give him a richer 
conception of what an interest is, and permit him a more plausible and robust 
account of moral motivation. He would gain a broader and less revisionist 
account of moral reasons. This would itself be a good thing. For universalizable 
agent-relative reasons are some of the deepest-rooted and most powerful reasons 
we have, and no universalist, deontological moral theory worth its salt can 
afford to ignore them. It would also men that (U) would be less restrictive and 
not so vulnerable to the standard objection. 
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Of course the revision I am proposing will require adjustments elsewhere 
in the theory. Habermas will have to redraw  the ‘razor-sharp’ distinction that 
(U) is supposed to make between the moral and the ethical. This is just as well. 
For Habermas’s thesis that ethical values and moral norms divide neatly up 
along the lines of the agent-relativity/agent-neutrality distinction, seems to rest 
on wishful architectonic considerations rather than on sound moral 
phenomenology. Indeed, in the face of much criticism, Habermas has begun to 
concede that relation between the good and the right, between ethics and 
morality may be much closer and much messier than he initially supposed.
 
(ED 
44: OCCM 343)
30
 It which case there is all the more reason to investigate the 
role of universalizable agent-relative reasons in moral discourse. This would 
open up a vista onto the complex dialectic that exists between agent-relative the 
agent-neutral reasons, which we more readily recognize as moral.  
Furthermore, the revision I am proposing is minor and involves low costs 
to the theory of Discourse Ethics. This marks it out from almost all current 
criticisms from the direction of communitarianism or the ‘ethics of care’, and 
which are, in my view, much too ready to give up on the central deontological 
and universalist aspirations of Discourse Ethics.
31
 If such criticism is well-
aimed, it is not easy to see how it can be accommodated without drastic 
revisions to the theory. The alternative I have offered is more appealing. I have 
shown how Discourse Ethics can be made plausible with the help of a more 
nuanced account of the conditions of the universalizability of interests, and still 
live up to its original aim of providing a genuinely intersubjective, deontological 
and universalist moral theory. 
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